Little empirical work has quantified the transitory effects of macroeconomic shocks on farm-level production behavior. We develop a simple analytical model to explain how macroeconomic shocks might temporarily divert managerial attention, thereby affecting farm-level productivity, but perhaps to different degrees and for different durations across production units. We then successfully test hypotheses from that model using panel data bracketing massive currency devaluation in the west African nation of Côte d'Ivoire. We find a transitory increase in mean plot-level technical inefficiency among Ivorien rice producers and considerable variation in the magnitude and persistence of this effect, attributable largely to ex ante complexity of operations, and the educational attainment and off-farm employment status of the plot manager. 
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I. Introduction
Although economies do not move instantly from one long-term equilibrium to another, most empirical and theoretical analysis focuses on comparative statics and the long-term general equilibrium effects of macroeconomic shocks. Relatively little attention has been paid to the response paths followed by individual producers as they adjust from one equilibrium to another, and particularly not to empirical assessment of the dynamic response of small farmers responding to major policy shocks in low-income economies. Yet smallholders' response to potentially long periods of disequilibrium may have important aggregate effects on output and rural poverty in low-income agrarian economies undertaking major macroeconomic reforms.
There may also be predictable variation in dynamic responses across individuals. Schultz (1964 Schultz ( , 1975 hypothesized that the ability to deal with disequilibrium induced by economic shocks is largely a function of education, with better educated individuals adjusting more successfully than less educated agents. The basic idea is simple and intuitive; appropriate adjustment to shocks requires the collection and processing of new information, and better educated individuals would be expected, on average, to excel at such tasks. Schultz's primary interest was technological shocks, but his point applies more broadly. Yet, despite the plethora of macroeconomic adjustment programs in low-and middle-income economies over the past two decades, we are unaware of any studies of interhousehold differences in the rate or extent of recovery from producer-level disequilibria potentially induced by macroeconomic shocks.
An obvious reason for the dearth of empirical testing of the Schultzian hypothesis, or of the effects of macro shocks on producer behavior more broadly, has been a lack of panel production data straddling a major shock. One must be able to identify cross-sectional differences in observational units' intertemporal changes in behavior and performance. In this paper we use a 1993-95 panel data set of rice farmers in the west African nation of Côte d'Ivoire, straddling the massive devaluation of that country 's currency in 1994, to test (i) whether the macroeconomic shock is manifest at the microeconomic level in the plot-level technical efficiency of producers, (ii) whether there exist identifiable cross-sectional differences in the immediate impact of the shock, and (iii) whether the Schultzian hypothesis holds, that education is an important determinant of cross-sectional differences in subsequent recovery.
Our strategy in this paper is to start, in section II, by building a simple analytical model wherein a sharp change in the external economic environment (e.g., product and factor price ratios) diverts managerial attention from directly productive tasks in order to make sense of changes in the broader economic environment. We hypothesize that this diversion may have a measurable effect on productivity that could vary predictably across farmers. Section III then introduces the data we use to test these hypotheses. We show that currency devaluation caused sharp changes in relative prices and price variability in rural Côte d'Ivoire, proving stimulative in aggregate to the nation's rice sector, although yields per hectare fell. Section IV then introduces the original econometric method we use to implement the analytical model, estimating a timeinvariant rice production frontier jointly with the correlates of plot-specific technical inefficiency, specified so as to enable us to test directly for intertemporal changes in technical inefficiency in the wake of the macroeconomic shock. Section V reports our estimation results.
We find that technical inefficiency increased immediately following the shock, then recovered somewhat the subsequent year. There exists significant cross-sectional variation in estimated technical inefficiency changes, for example with respect to farmer educational attainment and off-farm employment status, and the complexity of the farming operation. Section V concludes with some thoughts on the micro-level dynamics of adjustment to macro-level policy reforms, how those dynamics may vary across households and the implications for the design of policy reforms.
II. A Model of Farm Manager Response to Macroeconomic Shock
First we construct a simple reduced form model of producer behavior in which exogenous shocks may temporarily divert managerial attention, thereby reducing unobservable labor quality and yielding an increase in estimated technical inefficiency on the farm. The shock's immediate impact and intertemporal propagation is conditional on individuals' exposure to the shock and on their capacity to deal with disequilibrium, hence the possibility of crosssectional differences in the initial impact of the shock and in the rate of recovery from any shock-induced effects. The analytical model yields testable hypotheses with respect to (i) the effects of a uniform exogenous (e.g., macroeconomic or technological) shock on mean producer technical inefficiency, as commonly estimated using labor allocation (i.e., time) data that cannot control for unobservable managerial attention (i.e., labor quality), (ii) characteristics that will cause cross-sectional variation in the extent of the disruptions manifest as increased estimated technical inefficiency, and (iii) the effects of human capital, education in particular, on the extent and pace of recovery from temporary efficiency disruptions. We will test those hypotheses econometrically in the subsequent section.
We start with a standard, basic model of a household that maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint, a time availability constraint, and a technology constraint. The latter is the focus of attention in this paper.
1 Let the variables y, a, l, and x represent output, area, labor, and variable non-labor inputs, respectively, with the function f(.) mapping the latter three into the former such that y  f(a,l,x) with f(.) monotone in each argument. In theory, this constraint binds at all optima, so that in long-run equilibrium, optimizing producers should exhibit perfect technical efficiency, y = f(a,l,x). Nonetheless, most empirical studies find evidence of technical inefficiency, i.e., that y i = f(a i ,l i ,x i )-u i with u i a non-negative, plot-specific technical inefficiency parameter, strictly positive for most plots (Ali and Byerlee 1991) .
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In distinguishing between managers and manual laborers, economists have long 1 In the interests of brevity, we do not present a fully specified household behavioral model of constrained utility maximization. The results of the simpler, reduced form model we present follow directly from such a model under the assumption that the returns to spending a unit of scarce time collecting and processing information in the wake of a macroeconomic shock is at least equal to the opportunity cost of labor, equal to roughly US$0.60/day at prevailing unskilled agricultural wages. Given how pervasive long discussions about the consequences of FCFA devaluation were in rural Côte d'Ivoire following the shock, this seems a very mild assumption.
2 There is some reason to suspect that econometric error may substantially overstate smallholder technical inefficiency in much of the literature (Ali and Byerlee 1991 , Barrett 1997 , Sherlund et al. 2002 . The problem of interpreting estimated technical inefficiency parameters lies at the heart of this paper since our model ultimately revolves around the unobservability of managerial attention.
implicitly recognized that effective labor is effectively a composite of two distinct inputs: time spent in physical work (w) and managerial attention to that work (m). Let us represent this relationship by the function l(w,m), which is strictly monotonically increasing in both arguments, reflecting the basic idea that work on which one is concentrating is more productive than either thought without physical effort or thoughtless activity. The physical and the cognitive dimensions of labor can be pursued simultaneously. While undertaking the physical work required on a plot, a farmer may concentrate on the tasks at hand and get them done efficiently.
Or he may spend some of his measurable labor time thinking about things other than the current task, including matters that affect the farm, such as the effects of changing relative prices on input procurement and output sales patterns, next period's crop choice, etc. The (partial) diversion of managerial attention away from the immediate, menial task at hand might affect the quality of the manual labor undertaken and thereby productivity.
The imperfect relationship between time expended in physical work, w, and effective labor effort, l, underpins the vast literature on moral hazard in agricultural labor markets, in which hired workers are understood as able to reduce their effective labor effort without reducing the time they spend working, i.e., to shirk. Here we apply the same basic concept with a somewhat different twist. Rather than shirking as hired laborers might, owner-managers may have their attention temporarily diverted by exogenous events that require concentrated thought that can nonetheless be undertaken, perhaps at an efficiency cost, while performing other, more menial tasks. Such exogenous events might include macroeconomic or sectoral reforms that cause substantial swings in relative price ratios.
This issue of partial diversion of attention becomes important because only the physical work time of the farmer is directly measurable. Empirical studies inevitably use w to proxy for l.
Since w and m are highly correlated with one another in owner-operated businesses like smallholder agriculture, and since both increase effective labor power, econometric estimates of the parameters of the production frontier estimated using w in place of l(w,m) will be susceptible to omitted relevant variables bias. For present purposes, however, the point on which we wish to focus is that when economic policy shocks distract managerial attention, effective labor input may decrease, yielding lower output for the same time spent in physical work. When w proxies for l(w,m), this reduction in output will appear as a deviation from the production frontier, i.e., as an increase in estimated technical inefficiency, u i . Given inability to measure directly m or its effect on output, we can understand u(m) as a weakly monotonically decreasing function of m.
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If exogenous shocks divert decision-makers' attention from directly productive activities as they collect and process information, weigh alternative courses of action, search for new buyers or suppliers, or some combination of these, then shocks may have transitorily adverse effects on productivity. 4 We can formalize this idea by representing the farm-level supply of managerial attention by the function m(φ it , c it , o it , h it ). The individual-specific shock effect felt by decision-maker i at time t, φ it , is nonnegative. The nonnegativity of φ it is arbitrary; one could equally make it nonpositive. The key is that the measure allows for no effect and that any environmental or exogenous shock, whether it increases or decreases welfare, requires some attention. It is important not to confuse welfare effects with the shock's inducement of behavioral response. The variable c is a nonnegative measure of the complexity of the manager's operations (e.g., the number of crops grown or the share of area planted in improved cultivars requiring careful management), o measures the off-farm work responsibilities of the decision-maker, and h is a measure of the manager's human capital endowment. Assume managerial attention is increasing in h and decreasing in the other three arguments.
The magnitude of the unobservable, individual-specific shock, φ it , is itself a function of the complexity of the operation being managed and of the human capital of the manager. In the case of agriculture, for example, as the share of area under modern varieties dependent on 3 u(m) is weakly monotone because u is bounded from below at zero. 4 Because the data we use are not well suited to investigating questions of allocative efficiency (for reasons we explain later), we ignore the question of changes in allocative efficiency in response to policy shocks. One could understand the phenomenon of transitory technical inefficiency due to the diversion of managerial attention as the short-term price managers pay for subsequent gains in allocative efficiency that result from managers having thought through the implications of changes in their environment while doing their menial work.
purchased inputs (e.g., seed, fertilizer, pesticides) increases, so does the dimensionality of the information collection and processing and contracting tasks faced by the smallholder, so a shock should have greater effect on those managing more complex enterprises. The effect of human capital, especially education, is qualitatively different in that it doesn't affect the magnitude of the immediate shock but rather the rate at which the shock's effects dissipate. Literacy, numeracy, and logical abilities are no shield against disruption, but they certainly help individuals respond quickly and effectively to shocks by gathering and processing information efficiently and accurately (Huffman 2002).
These relationships can be captured in the linear state equation,
where ρ is a positive first-order autoregressive parameter capturing the intertemporal propagation of the shock conditional on i's human capital endowment, α captures the effect of human capital on the shock's propagation, and ε t  ≥0 is a cross-sectionally uniform exogenous shock, like a macroeconomic policy reform or the introduction of a new production technology. Exogenous shocks' immediate effects are hypothesized to depend on farmer i's predetermined level of enterprise complexity, c it  . The Schultzian hypothesis suggests  α<0, that human capital accelerates recovery from the distraction caused by an exogenous shock. In this framework, ρ+ αh it =0 implies full recovery after only one period.
The effects of a common shock,  t , on the managerial attention of the i th operator at time t, m it , may therefore vary over time. The effects may emerge through any of several parallel transmission channels:
∂m it /∂ε t = ∂m/∂φ it ·c it + ∂m/∂c it ·∂c it /∂ε  t + ∂m/∂o it ·∂o it /∂ε  t + ∂m/∂h it ·∂h it /∂ε t (2) ∂m it+1 /∂ε t = ∂m/∂φ it ·c it (ρ+ αh it )+∂m/∂c it ·∂c it+1 /∂ε t +∂m/∂o it ·∂o it+1 /∂ε t +∂m/∂h it ·∂h it+1 /∂ε t (3)
By the weak monotonicity of u in m, the effect of a common shock,  t , on plot-and periodspecific technical inefficiency will vary across individual operators and time periods: ∂u it /∂ε  t = ∂u/∂m [∂m/∂φ it ·c it + ∂m/∂c it ·∂c it /∂ε t + ∂m/∂o it ·∂o it /∂ε t + ∂m/∂h it ·∂h it /∂ε t ]
∂u it+1 /∂ε t = ∂u/∂m[∂m/∂φ·c it (ρ+ αh it )+ ∂m/∂c it ·∂c it+1 /∂ε t +∂m/∂o it ·∂o it+1 /∂ε t +∂m/∂h it ·∂h it+1 /∂ε t ] (5) Under the assumptions that ∂h it /∂ε t = ∂c it /∂ε t = ∂o it /∂ε t = 0, i.e., that neither the manager's stock of human capital, nor the complexity of her operations nor off-farm employment responsibilities change instantaneously, the effect of a uniform common shock, ε t , on contemporaneous estimated technical inefficiency should be positive because it reduces managerial attention and therefore labor productivity. The induced increase in technical inefficiency should be greater for managers overseeing more complex operations and somewhat less for those who reduce off-farm employment (e.g., in the nontradable service sector) in response to real exchange rate depreciation.
The difference of equations (5)- (4) identifies the factors affecting plot-level recovery in technical inefficiency (i.e., in output or yields, ceteris paribus):
Assume the shock has no effect on human capital, so the last parenthetical expression in (6) equals zero, and that  is negative, as predicted by Schultz. Then recovery in technical inefficiency is greatest (i.e., the value of (6) is lower) for managers with more human capital or who reallocate time from off-farm obligations in response to the shock, as reflected in the first and third parenthetical expressions, respectively, on the righthand side of equation (6). If the shock induces an increase (decrease) in the complexity of the operation, technical inefficiency will increase (decrease). This simple analytical model yields several hypotheses which we test in section III.
To summarize graphically, we hypothesize that devaluation induces a sharp adjustment in relative prices, depicted in stylized form in Figure 1 as a pivoting of the price line about the production frontier. But the diversion of managerial attention may cause producers to move from the old equilibrium at E 0 to a new long-run equilibrium at E L in two or more steps.
Omitting, for the sake of brevity, the possibility of temporary allocative inefficiency, 5 the 5 In Figure 1 , allocative inefficiency would appear as selection of a point on the production frontier other than the response path of our stylized producer to the common exogenous shock, may involve an This line of reasoning builds on a literature on the "human capital approach to allocative efficiency" that emerged in the 1970s among Chicago students of Becker, Griliches and Schultz.
That literature emphasized the central role of education in achieving allocative efficiency, above all in agriculture (Griliches 1963 , Welch 1970 , 1978 Fane 1975; Huffman 2002; Ram 1980) . Its focus was on the role of education in an environment of technological change, as was appropriate in post-war United States agriculture and during the Green Revolution abroad. More recently, technology shocks have been less common than policy shocks in low-income agriculture, so our focus differs because the context of disequilibrium has changed. The earlier literature also generally assumed perfect technical efficiency and introduced education directly into the production function as an input. Our approach accommodates the empirical regularity of estimated technical inefficiency. More importantly, it allows us to identify education's periodspecific value in helping producers adjust to shocks. As Schultz (1964 Schultz ( , 1975 famously posited, human capital probably matters little to stable, traditional production, but becomes valuable to those dealing with disequilibrium. So we opt to estimate instead producers' technical inefficiency and then check whether human capital has an effect on the magnitude of the initial point of tangency with the relative price line.
shock, the recovery from the shock, or both.
III. Data and the FCFA Devaluation
We use data from the farm management and household survey ( The FCFA devaluation aimed to correct price distortions caused by an overvalued currency and thereby to induce change in input and output choices and to stimulate tradables sectors such as rice. In the FMHS survey regions, the nominal local market price of local variety rice increased 47.9 percent from 1993 to 1995 (Table 1 ). This reflected a real increase in the rice price, as manifest by a 49.2 percent increase in the ratio of the rice price to the price of yams, a locally nontradable food. Since nontradable labor and land are the major costs of rice production in Côte d'Ivoire, devaluation increased incentives for producers to bring additional inputs into rice cultivation in spite of increased real prices for tradable inputs (e.g., chemicals). Good standardized input price series are not available in the FMHS data, but using labor markets transactions data we estimate that the ratio of the rice price to the adult male wage rate increased remain statistically significant, year-specific yield effects (Sherlund et al. 2002) . This paper explores whether the apparent transitory yield shocks might reflect micro-level disequilibrium dynamics of the sort posited in the preceding section.
Knowing that area under cultivation increased following devaluation, it is plausible that a yield decline could be attributable to extensification onto less fertile land. But the FMHS includes detailed biophysical information on plots -soil fertility, slope, etc. -enabling us to control for any such change in the subsequent frontier estimation. Moreover, extensification would be inconsistent with the transitory nature of observed yield declines.
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The price data support the claim that exchange rate devaluation can induce temporary uncertainty that might divert managerial attention. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 13-month centered moving average prices for locally produced rice, as well as the time path of the coefficient of variation of those prices. 8 One sees a clear shock to the relative (much less absolute) variation of the rice price series, beginning with devaluation in early 1994. The coefficient of variation in rice prices increased sharply for a period of almost a year before settling down at a new, higher level. 9 Our own casual conversations with Ivorien smallholders reveal that they indeed spent much time mulling over the implications of this shock and the resulting uncertainty. So while it cannot be directly corroborated empirically, the sort of managerial attention diversion that we model in the abstract indeed appears plausible.
By way of a brief tangent, we note that this model also offers an alternative way to understand the empirical regularity of short-run price elasticities of crop supply that are significantly lower than the corresponding long-run price elasticities (Askari and Cummings 1976, Rao 1989) . Typically, the deviation of short-run from long-run elasticities is attributed to quasi-fixed factors of production (e.g., land), adaptive expectations formation, or unspecified convex adjustment costs. We do not challenge these other, quite sensible explanations. Because it explicitly introduces adjustment dynamics, however, the present model offers another, complementary explanation of the oft-observed phenomenon. 10 In our model, there are no expectations, no quasi-fixed factors, and convexity is not imposed on the explicitly identified source of the adjustment costs.
IV. Estimation Methods
In order to test the hypotheses developed earlier, we jointly estimate a stochastic production frontier and correlates of technical inefficiency in Ivorien rice production. As a result, we also derive plot-specific estimates of technical inefficiency. Correlates of technical inefficiency include farmer-specific characteristics hypothesized to affect the extent and persistence of transitory technical inefficiency. 11 Since there is no reason to believe that a discrete change to relative prices would fundamentally change a traditional production technology over a year or two, and because the intertemporal comparisons on which we focus require a common reference point, we estimate a time-invariant production frontier.
The empirical production frontier literature generally follows one of two methods. The preponderance of the published literature follows the stochastic production frontier (SPF) approach independently pioneered by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) . In this approach, one specifies a priori a functional form for the production frontier (e.g., Cobb-Douglas or translog) defining output (Y) as a function of variable (X) and fixed or exogenous (W) variables and probability density functions for the asymmetric technical inefficiency parameter, u (typically the half-normal or truncated normal), and the symmetric statistical error parameter, v (usually the normal). Letting i index plots and t index growing seasons, the SPF specification is thus Y it = f(X it , W it ) -u it + v it . Then the (log-) likelihood function may be written out and maximum likelihood used to estimate the parameters of interest.
The second approach uses nonparametric, data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to impose monotonicity and concavity properties on the estimated frontier and otherwise make no functional form or distributional assumptions about the shape of the production frontier. This flexibility comes at the considerable cost, however, of an assumed absence of measurement or 11 Because managers may be aware of their technical inefficiency and adjust input applications accordingly, estimating the primal production function may introduce simultaneity bias. However, if the market level price data available are weakly related to the true shadow prices guiding farmer decisions in an environment of considerable transactions costs, risk, quality variation, etc., then price observations will introduce errors in variables problems in estimation of dual cost or profit functions. Since price recordation occurred only at regional level in the FMHS data set and many plots' inputs (e.g., child labor, adult family labor, land, animal traction, soil quality, slope) were not purchased and so have no observed prices associated with them, we opt for the primal method in the present analysis based on the belief that with adequate controls for farm-level production conditions, endogeneity bias related to inputs is likely considerably less than errors in variables bias related to prices in these data.
sampling error (Färe et al. 1994) . 12 We focus on the former, stochastic parametric approach, although an earlier version of this paper included DEA results that were qualitatively similar, indeed, even more striking in magnitude and statistical significance. In short, our findings appear robust to the technical inefficiency estimation method employed. Jondrow et al. (1982) show how to estimate the conditional expectation of the plot-specific technical efficiency parameter (conditional upon the composed error term, v i -u i ) in stochastic parametric frontier estimation. One problem with this approach, however, is that the technical inefficiency parameter is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. This clearly is not the case if we suspect (and find) that the technical inefficiency parameter is related to variables such as managerial characteristics and practices that vary across firms.
To combat this potential problem, some studies suggest estimating the production frontier and the relationship between technical inefficiency and the sources of inefficiency jointly, rather than in a two-step procedure. Kumbhakar et al. (1991) Other studies have concentrated on the panel data aspects of production frontier estimation. Pitt and Lee (1981) implement a random effects treatment to estimate a stochastic 12 The output-oriented, variable returns to scale, strong disposability DEA model may be written: 2*(X i ,Y i |VRS,SD) = Max 2,z 2, subject to 2Y i #zY, zX # X i , 3 i z i = 1, and z 0 R N + , where i = 1,...,N and z is the activity vector indicating to which plots the i th plot is being compared. The resulting output measure of technical efficiency is bounded from below at one, 2 $ 1, and represents the multiple by which output may be expanded, holding the input bundle constant, had the i th plot been fully efficient.
production frontier. Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990 Kumbhakar ( , 1991 We implement Battese and Coelli's model, wherein the technical inefficiency parameter is related to a vector of farmer-specific managerial variables subject to statistical error, so that u it = Z it  δ + ξ it  ≥0, where ξ it ~ N(0, σ 2 ξ ), i indexes firms, and t indexes time. But since u it ≥ 0, ξ it ≥ -Z it  δ so that the distribution of ξ it is truncated from below at the variable truncation point, -Z it  δ  .
The statistical error of the production frontier is assumed to be mean-zero, normally distributed with variance σ 2 v . Then the log-likelihood function for the i th firm at time t takes the form
where f(X it , W it ; β , θ) is the production frontier, β , θ,δ, γ and σ 2 are the parameters to be We use a translog specification for the production frontier, imposing separability between the X and W variables in order to conserve degrees of freedom:
13 13 The presence of many zero-valued observations is troublesome. The convention in much literature is to set ln(0) = 0. However, due to observations taking on values in the range (0,1], setting ln(0) = 0 implicitly reorders observations with respect to that subspace. So instead, we set ln(0) = ln (./10), where . is the smallest strictly positive observation in the sample. We tried to address the problem of zero-valued observations instead through the use of other flexible functional forms, e.g., generalized Leontief, CES-CT-GL, and symmetric generalized McFadden, but all failed diagnostic tests for satisfaction of regularity conditions (Waldman 1982) .
Rice production (Y it ) is measured in kilograms. The variable inputs (X it ) consist of land (in ares), various measures of labor (in hours) and chemical fertilizer (in kilograms), while W it , includes the categorical variables for soil erosivity, soil fertility, soil aptitude, topographic location and region-specific dummies, as well as continuous variables reflecting plot slope, pest infestation, weed density, weed height, plant disease, rainy days, and rainfall. Because both rainfall measures are common to all plots in a region, they also capture some year-andregion-specific unobserved heterogeneity not captured by the time invariant regional dummy variables and should therefore be interpreted with care.
Since our inquiry focuses on the intertemporal response of plot-level technical inefficiency to a macroeconomic shock, we specify the technical inefficiency equation as:
where the indicator variables I 93 and I 95 equal one for 1993 and 1995 observations, respectively, and zero otherwise. The vector of characteristics (Z it ) affecting technical inefficiency include the proportion of area planted in modern rice varieties, years of rice cropping experience, the number of total crops cultivated, and dummy variables for completion of elementary school or secondary or tertiary education, married women, unmarried women, 14 off-farm work in agriculture, offfarm work outside of the agricultural sector and geographic region. The inclusion of a technical inefficiency equation allows for the possibility of systematic deviation from the production frontier. We follow Schultz in hypothesizing that experience and education heavily influence such deviations and thus include them as regressors in the technical inefficiency equation rather than in the production function as proxies for labor quality. This is necessary if one wishes to test directly the Schultzian hypothesis that education reduces technical inefficiency.
This specification permits interpretation of theδ 2 and δ 3 estimates from equation (2) as year-on-year differences in technical inefficiency since u i94 -u i93 = -I 93 Z it  δ 2 and u i95 -u i94 = I 95 Z it  δ 3. Based on the analytical model advanced in section II, we would expect the estimates of δ 2 to include negative coefficient estimates on the complexity of the farming operation (share in modern varieties, number of crops). We would likewise expect the δ 3 estimates to include negative coefficients on educational attainment and experience, reflecting the salutary effects of human capital in dealing with disequilibrium, and on the off-farm non-agricultural employment dummy, since Ivorien farmers with jobs in the (largely nontradable) tertiary sector generally reallocated time from off-farm employment towards farming, albeit while still maintaining offfarm employment for financial liquidity and risk management purposes (Barrett et al. 2001 ).
V. Transitory Technical Inefficiency in Ivorien Rice Production
In the interests of brevity, we do not dwell on the full set of production frontier coefficient estimates, which are reported and discussed in detail in Sherlund et al. (2002) . The results are intuitive and standard. For example, plot-level output is strongly increasing in land, labor and chemical fertilizer, with hired labor and chemicals appearing to be substitutes.
Environmental conditions matter a great deal to rice output as well, with expected output decreasing in plant disease and pest incidence, weed density and height, and plot slope, and increasing in days of rain and rainfall volume, as well as in more favorable agroecological regions. Instead, we move directly to explore the intertemporal patterns of technical inefficiency evident in these data and to test the hypotheses posed by the model of section II.
The first question concerns the evolution of plot-specific technical inefficiency in the wake of massive currency devaluation. As hypothesized, inefficiency increased from 1993 to supported by these data.
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Our model not only predicts a temporary increase (decrease) in estimated technical inefficiency (output) on average, it also hypothesizes predictable cross-sectional differences in changes in inefficiency. In particular, the initial, adverse managerial diversion effects of the shock should be felt most acutely on plots managed by operators who supervise relatively more complex operations or who have off-farm employment that gives them a place to collect information on changing market conditions and to reflect on the implications of these changes for their farming practices (rather than doing this only while farming). We use the number of different crops under the control of the plot manager (crops) and the proportion of the plot planted in modern rice varieties (modern) to capture operational complexity. Most operators did not change the complexity of their operations during the survey period. So although our model 15 In these data, an observationally equivalent explanation would be that the exchange rate shock induced expansion of cultivated area and farmers gradually learn about new lands brought into cultivation. As such, technical inefficiency would first rise as new lands are brought into cultivation, then fall as farmers gain experience with the new plots. Of course, this learning-by-doing explanation would imply no change in technical inefficiency in the event of an exogenous shock that reduced cultivated area. Distinguishing between these two explanations must be left to another data set in which the macro shock does not induce extensification of cultivation.
suggests that the effect of the shock on complexity should itself affect the magnitude of the common shock's effect on plot-and-period-specific technical inefficiency, we omit the change in complexity variable because it is clearly endogenous and we haven't suitable instruments for predicting such changes. 16 Similarly, we do not include changes in off-farm employment status since this is plainly endogenous and because change in off-farm employment was almost entirely infra-marginal, enjoying adjustments in hours worked rather than cessation or commencement of employment (Barrett et al. 2001 ).
Although our model posits that human capital does not prevent farmers suffering the effects of shocks initially, it predicts that higher levels of human capital should lead to faster recovery in technical inefficiency in the subsequent recovery period, from 1994 to 1995. We use the operator's rice farming experience (measured in years) and highest level of schooling completed (captured by dummy variables for elementary school or for secondary or higher education) to proxy for human capital, and assume no change in these adults' education levels in the wake of FCFA devaluation.
17 Table 2 reports the technical inefficiency equation estimates. Note that, even though we report the estimates separately, the stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency equations are indeed estimated jointly. Across all three years, those with little or no education and off-farm employment in agriculture have significantly lower technical inefficiency --likely because of reciprocal labor sharing arrangements and learning from others on whose farms they work --while the relatively well-educated who also work off-farm in the nonagricultural sector likewise exhibit greater technical efficiency. There are significant differences in technical inefficiency across the three agroecological regions spanned by these data. Farmers in the more humid forest and forest-savannah transition zones appear more efficient than those in the drier savannah zone.
The estimates reported in Table 2 Table 3 .
Subsequent recovery nonetheless appears greater for more experienced and educated operators, and the estimation results support this Schultzian hypothesis. The human capital variables are jointly significant in the recovery phase -- Table 3 Off-farm employment plainly matters to patterns of farm efficiency response to macroeconomic shocks, although the coefficient estimates in Table 2 suggest a pattern more complicated than we can fully explain here with these data. Unlike the education or farm complexity variables, the off-farm employment variables have jointly statistically significant effects on both the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 Those with nonagricultural off-farm work, however, not only suffered smaller adverse initial inefficiency effects, but they also improved further in 1995, as reflected in a negative and statistically significant estimated effect among those with at least elementary education. Future research might usefully explore these seemingly heterogeneous effects of off-farm employment on farm productivity, in order to establish to what extent these might relate to informational, financial liquidity, or labor timing differences across different types of off-farm employment.
Overall, the estimation results support the hypotheses advanced by our simple model.
The macroeconomic shock of currency devaluation appears to have had a significant transitory effect on technical inefficiency felt most acutely among smallholders managing relatively complex operations. The rate and extent of recovery, however, depends primarily on operator human capital, in the form of experience and education, on the complexity of the farming operation, and, in a complicated way, on off-farm employment status.
The point that education hastens one's response to shocks but doesn't shield one from them is a more nuanced finding than appears in the existing literature. For example, Glewwe and Hall (1998 ), using 1985 and 1990 panel data from Peru, found that households with better educated heads were less vulnerable to the adverse effects of macroeconomic shocks. But their data did not permit them to establish whether it was the relatively more rapid speed of ex post adaptation or less initial exposure to the shock that accounted for the superior performance over five years among households with better educated heads. Similarly, the "human capital approach to allocative efficiency" literature consistently found that education positively affects agricultural output, the allocative efficiency of farmers, or both (Griliches 1963 , Welch 1970 , 1978 Fane 1975; Huffman 2002; Ram 1980) . But that literature failed to identify the context-dependent returns to education. Education seems to pay off most in the wake of substantial disruptions to the economic environment and when the operation managed is relatively more complex. Our analysis brings out these important refinements, offering empirical support to Schultz's seminal claim that human capital enhances one's ability to adapt to changing economic circumstances (Schultz 1964 (Schultz , 1975 . Of course we cannot tell in these data whether people who go far in school are inherently more adaptable or whether they learned something there that helps them adapt. So while our results suggest education is important, one must keep in mind that education might merely proxy for unobserved human capital more generally.
VI. Conclusions
Macroeconomic shocks affect microeconomic decision-makers. The short-run burden of collecting and processing information on which operators base resource reallocation decisions, and of finding new trading partners and negotiating new contracts may divert managerial attention from directly productive activities, causing transitory increases in technical inefficiency and therefore to (perhaps temporary) deviations of output below its potential. The disruption of the shock costs the economy aggregate output, but the effect is not uniformly experienced.
Rather, there are predictable cross-sectional differences across operators in the extent to which the shock diverts managerial attention and therefore in induced transitory inefficiency.
Although education is no shield against the initial adverse effects of a shock, the pace and extent of subsequent recovery depends heavily on managerial human capital. Managers with greater experience and cognitive abilities process information more quickly and more accurately, enabling faster recovery from the initial impact of a shock. So investment in universal education might bear dividends in the form of reduced foregone output in the wake of disruptive shocks, reinforcing the Schultzian argument that the returns to education increase as dynamic changes in the economy become greater or more frequent.
The magnitude of the technical inefficiency increases resulting from macroeconomic shocks appears greatest for those managing more complex operations and somewhat less for those who couple farming with off-farm employment. This underscores the need for extension assistance to more complex, commercialized farms in times of sharp macroeconomic adjustment.
It also reinforces previous findings on the importance of rural non-farm economy to performance in the agricultural sector and the need for policymakers to devote more time to understanding the complex farm-nonfarm relationship in rural communities (Reardon et al. 1992 (Reardon et al. , 1998 .
The literature on producer response to macroeconomic and sectoral shocks has yet to address these issues although they surely matter to short-run sectoral and macroeconomic performance and to the welfare of poor smallholder subpopulations. Less well-educated smallholders and those who bear the domestic burdens of disequilibrium, chiefly women, fall behind their better-educated and less-encumbered counterparts. These effects may help explain the sluggish response of agricultural output to policy shocks over the past two decades in much of the low-income world (Barrett and Carter 1999) . No. observations 464 *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. 
